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Globalisation is affecting daily life almost everywhere, so it seemed logical when the 2005 UN Report on the World Social Situation, 
The Inequality Predicament, reported that economic inequality is dramatically increasing in Asia, as it has been in the rest of the 
world. This trend is embedded in spatial and social patterns reproduced over the last two centuries – patterns that comprise a deeper, 
more pervasive ‘inequality predicament’ than the UN dares to recognise.
David Ludden
Markets, inequality and territory
To explain prevailing patterns of inequality, we can begin with 
Ankie Hoogvelt’s useful argument that markets move assets 
around the world in networks that privilege some places and 
people over others. Yet markets alone do not explain why 
wealth accumulates where it does. Property ownership defines 
legal entitlements to assets that move within markets. Laws 
governing property rights, citizenship, inheritance, taxation, 
state patronage and other state concerns construct authority 
over national territory in a way that channels market access 
and wealth to preferred people and places. These are territo-
rial systems of entitlement, and they create ‘topographies’ of 
inequality in which markets operate and thus help determine 
where wealth accumulates.
Territoriality is therefore critical for understanding inequality. 
Even though globalisation is deterritorializing global capital-
ism, national territorialism is alive and well, and it may be get-
ting stronger. National authorities exert control over transport, 
finance and communication infrastructure as well as trade 
regimes that make globalisation work. Empirically, globalisa-
tion is composed of collections of national data, and the activi-
ties that constitute globalisation always occur inside national 
territories, which are thus strategic vantage points for studies 
of globalisation.
Yet national territory is not the only kind of territory affecting 
inequality. Imperial forms of territorial order are also at work. 
Though mainstream social science has defined empire and 
nation as incompatible, and has made modern history appear 
to be an irreversible progression from empire to nation, impe-
rial power and authority continue to shape inequality in the 
world of national sovereignty. 
Imperial forms
We can explain prevailing patterns of inequality more effec-
tively by locating national states and world capitalism at inter-
sections of two kinds of imperial history, one global and the 
other regional. Three features of imperial territory are most 
crucial for such analysis. First, empire consists of culturally 
visible ranks of authority and privilege, supported by coercive 
power. Each place and person occupies a specific rank in the 
‘many layered cake’ of empire. Second, empires form spa-
tially expanding and contracting – hence essentially mobile 
– systems of territorial order. Imperial boundaries never stand 
still for long. Third, imperial territory is controlled unevenly. 
Struggles inside empire’s ‘many layered cake’ shift power up 
and down the ranks; rebellions counteract top-down authority; 
and some places are simply not worth integrating thoroughly 
into imperial ranks.
Though firmly fixed boundaries of the national sort do not 
exist in empires, historians have nonetheless endeavoured 
to lock imperial territoriality into maps and timelines that 
mark the ‘rise and fall’ of each empire. We can, however, 
distinguish histories of imperial territoriality from histo-
ries of specific empires. Exploring this distinction reveals 
the historic reproduction of imperial forms of power and 
authority across transitions to national modernity which 
take place through long cycles of construction, expansion, 
integration, fracture, disruption, fragmentation, dispersion 
and reorganisation. 
Global empires
Today’s spatial pattern of global inequality is part of an impe-
rial cycle stretching back to the 19th century. After 1945, old 
imperial nations reproduced their global supremacy by sitting 
on the UN Security Council, forming NATO, meeting at Bret-
ton Woods and Davos, to mention just a few venues during 
the new form of inter-imperial struggle that was called ‘Cold 
War’. In the 1970s, a post-war economic boom ended and a 
new global development regime came into place led by the 
richest countries, the World Bank and the IMF, which came 
to dominate economic policy-making in most poor countries. 
This global development regime enforced structural adjust-
ment policies and produced today’s unprecedented global 
uniformity of free-market-oriented national economic poli-
cies which induce poor country exports, promote imports and 
open debtor nations to global investors. 
Long-term trends in international inequality represent a 
reproduction of old imperial patterns. Between 1870 and 
1985, per capita income ratios between rich and poor coun-
tries increased six-fold, as income levels dispersed over an 
ever-widening range. Since the 19th century, new wealth 
produced by economic development has tended to augment 
disproportionately the wealth of already richer countries. But 
neo-liberal economic theory denies the imperial character 
of such trends; in the words of NY Times columnist David 
Brookes, for example, ‘today’s rich don’t exploit the poor; 
they just out-compete them’. In this view, more productive 
people earn more by merit and inequality increases because 
markets do not provide unproductive people what they need 
to compete successfully in the market. Such logic induces 
major development agencies to promote ‘pro-poor growth’ 
policies, which rely on governments, NGOs and businesses 
to provide loans, education, health, housing and jobs that 
poor people need to compete. Yet despite pro-poor initia-
tives, inequality is increasing in most countries. 
The persistent tendency of imperial power and authority to 
channel wealth up the ranks has locked in place today’s ‘ine-
quality predicament’ by giving elites more capital to invest, 
which spurs economic growth but reduces the proportion of 
new wealth available at lower echelons. Economists have now 
shown conclusively, as Martin Ravallion says, that, ‘At any 
positive rate of growth, the higher the initial inequality, the 
lower the rate at which income-poverty falls’. In other words, 
increasing inequality reduces the rate at which people escape 
poverty, as it channels more wealth into elite hands during 
economic growth. Thus inequality under capitalism exerts a 
‘poverty effect’ and a ‘growth effect’ at the same time. 
In recent decades, during a surge of globalisation, the world 
has become richer under free-market-oriented economic poli-
cies, but asset inequality has also increased, meaning less new 
wealth available for reducing poverty is serving that purpose. 
Over the past four decades, the ratio of wealth held by the 
world’s richest and poorest quintiles almost tripled from 
30:1 to 86:1. The 1996 Human Development Report stated: 
‘The poorest 20% of the world’s people saw their share of 
global wealth decline from 2.3% to 1.4% in the [preceding] 
30 years…[as] the share of the richest 20% rose from 70% to 
80%’. In the United States, the richest 20% have increased 
their share of national income from 44% to 50%, and the rich-
est 1% increased theirs from 7% to 13%. America is now more 
unequal – and the gap between rich and poor more expansive 
– than at any time since the start of the Great Depression.
Economic measures reveal that inequality increased dramati-
cally during the global expansion of a neo-liberal economic 
policy regime, especially since the end of the Cold War, as 
more of the world’s assets have been privatized. Freeing up 
world markets – to the extent that rich countries have allowed 
this to occur – has disproportionately enriched rich countries, 
and especially rich people in rich countries.
Imperial India
Asian history is a composite of many imperial cycles across 
many regions. In South Asia, modern cycles began in the late 
18th century when the Mughal Empire broke into regions 
of subordinate authority: imperial power descended the 
territorial ranks, regional elites became more independent 
and Mughal authority became merely symbolic. The British 
adopted and altered Mughal imperial forms, added indus-
trial capitalism, built a new imperial order and expanded 
Indian imperial territory beyond its former limits. Beginning 
at the height of British imperial power, Indian nationalists 
identified their nation with British territory and then, as two 
world wars weakened all imperial nations except America, 
struggled to usurp imperial authority. In 1947, British impe-
rial territory fractured into national territories where impe-
rial forms of power and authority acquired new life. India’s 
recent surge in economic growth under its neo-liberal policy 
regime is part of this imperial history, as Tirthankar Roy 
indicates when he says India has returned to free-market 
policies that prevailed in Queen Victoria’s day. This ‘return’ 
is a moment in a long process of imperial transformation.
In the 19th century, the British refashioned India’s impe-
rial ranks into a modern entitlement system that channelled 
wealth upward through state institutions and markets. 
Imperial capitalism embedded itself deeply in India during 
a surge of globalisation before World War One, when world 
GDP grew more quickly than during any decade until 1990. 
In 1914, most goods arriving at South Asian ports were for 
export. The American Consul at Bombay described British 
India as ‘one of the few large countries of the world where 
there is an “open door” for the trade of all countries’. British 
India was the world’s fourth largest industrial cotton textile 
producer, and manufactured goods comprised 20% of all 
exports, a figure never since surpassed. Over the next two 
decades, industrial output grew more quickly in India than 
in Britain and Germany, as trade with Britain at India’s five 
major ports fell to less than one-third of total trade. Indi-
an labour also went global. By 1921, Indian emigration far 
exceeded immigration, moving mostly to Ceylon, Malaya, 
East and South Africa, Fiji and the West Indies, all of which 
were part of the British Empire.
Wealth in British India followed typical imperial trajecto-
ries, enriching the British most of all but also elite Indians. 
Wealth moving up the ranks expanded the empire’s military 
and economic infrastructure, but growth was very slow and 
poverty increased. Extremes of inequality appeared during 
famines that killed millions, including several million dur-
ing World War Two in Bengal, where imperial priorities con-
centrated assets in Calcutta and left villagers to starve. The 
upward mobility of imperial wealth was apparent to nation-
alists for whom reducing its flow out of India became a basic 
goal. After independence, in 1947, national governments in 
South Asia kept more wealth inside their territories and thus 
accomplished a radical shift in the world’s imperial ranks by 
increasing the relative economic power of the world’s lower 
national echelons. India remained poor – since 1947 its per 
capita GDP has hovered at around 10% of the American-
British average – but India’s relative impoverishment trend 
compared to Britain and America stopped dead at independ-
ence.
The same holds true for China. In fact, increasing economic 
growth in both India and China slowed the rate of increase 
in international inequality for 30 years, until the late 1970s. 
After 1980, wealth in India and China increased even more 
quickly, and surged again after 1991, further reducing the 
rate of increase of international inequality. National ine-
quality, however, has increased in both countries in recent 
decades, as freeing up markets has spurred growth but also 
aggravated the imperial tendency of wealth to move up 
the ranks inside each country. Since 1980, inequality has 
increased in Asian countries that together are home to half 
the world’s population. 
Imperial dynamics help explain why India and China have 
been getting richer faster and at the same time more unequal 
nationally. Political power over economic resources has been 
shifting down the ranks into regions. As a result, national 
political systems have changed drastically. India’s 1956 reor-
ganisation of states enhanced regional growth after 1980, 
when Indian states began to gain more power over economic 
resources; regional party coalitions now control the central 
government. An analogous devolution in Mughal South Asia 
fuelled economic growth in coastal regions in the late 18th 
century. Current high growth rates in India and China derive 
significantly from similar imperial economic and political 
devolution. 
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Inequality in India
India’s imperial patterns of inequality reproduced themselves 
after independence. Nationalists extracted Indian territorial 
layers from the British Empire’s ‘many layered cake’, forged 
them into a more tightly integrated national economy, invest-
ed heavily in infrastructure, increased growth, eliminated 
famine, stabilised income inequality and decreased inequal-
ity generally through land reforms, public provisioning and 
subsidies for productive inputs like water, electricity, fertilizer 
and High Yielding Varieties of wheat and rice. 
But these national efforts did not eliminate India’s imperial 
ranks. India’s national development regime actually accen-
tuated wealth accumulation among privileged groups and in 
privileged places. In agrarian regions imbued with landlord 
property systems under the Mughals and British, private 
and public investment in agriculture, health and education 
remained comparatively low. National development policy ‘bet 
on the rich’ to secure economic growth. In the 1980s, people 
who had benefited most from their status in British imperial 
ranks and in India’s national development regime propelled 
India’s ‘return’ to free-market-oriented economic policies, 
which were no longer associated with empire but rather with 
being proudly and globally Indian. 
Higher growth rates resulted, and so did increased inequal-
ity. In the 1980s, rich regions got richer compared to poor 
regions. After 1991 growth increased more quickly and after 
1999 income inequality rose measurably: 2004 National 
Sample Survey data show that, after 1991, most new wealth 
went to wealthier classes with privileged access to government 
and new market opportunities. Between 1991 and 2004, the 
top quintile of India’s urban rich increased its per capita con-
sumption by 40%, compared to 20% in rural areas. The rural 
rich got richer, too, but compared to the urban rich, they also 
got poorer, which helps explain the 2004 change in govern-
ment. 
In 2004, the new Prime Minister faced 600 million Indians, 
in the bottom 80% of rural income groups, who had suffered 
a decline in per capita consumption under reforms he intro-
duced as Finance Minister in 1991 and now vowed to con-
tinue. But Manmohan Singh took pride in the 300 million 
Indian citizens who became richer under post-1991 liberaliza-
tion. The richest among them became media stars in India’s 
2006 global self-promotion as ‘the world’s fastest growing 
free-market democracy’.
Generic inequality
Patterns of inequality in India cannot be explained adequately 
as standard features of global capitalism or as symptoms of 
India’s national culture. Yet they do have generic qualities 
that characterize imperial forms of power and authority more 
generally. 
Generic imperial inequality has clear spatial attributes. 
Spatial inequality occurs when core locations become privi-
leged sites for capital accumulation. In both China and 
India, urban-rural and regional disparities institutional-
ized long before 1980 became rapidly worse after 1990. In 
India, recent growth favoured southern and western states, 
while distressing northern and north-eastern states that had 
been disadvantaged by public and private investment deci-
sions. Poverty in the eastern Gangetic basin dates back to the 
19th century, when the east-west divergence in North India 
entered imperial politics, as the Indian capital moved to New 
Delhi. This spatial divergence continued after independ-
ence with disproportionate state and private investments in 
the west. In the 1990s, economic returns in regions more 
dependent upon agriculture declined, as annual growth in 
agriculture and allied services dipped to less than half the 
rate of growth in India’s aggregate per capita GDP, and the 
ratio of rural-to-urban poverty increased. 
Broadly speaking, Asian regions most excluded from capital 
accumulation lie on peripheries of former Mughal, British, 
Dutch, French and Chinese empires, in mountainous regions 
spanning Nepal, north-east India, Chittagong Hill Tracts, 
highland Burma, Thailand, Vietnam and South China – all 
of which remain tribal minority homelands on peripheries of 
national control. City slums are internal peripheries no less 
excluded from capital accumulation.
Gender marks a second generic imperial form of inequality. 
Gender inequality is pervasive from the global to local levels. 
In 2003, a national study of gender disparities in India con-
cluded that the poorest states (home to half the total popula-
tion) had not improved the condition of women, while the 
worst gender disparities exist in rich, fast growing states, 
namely, Punjab and Haryana. Women’s wages and working 
conditions, and the social and environmental conditions of 
their domestic and communal labour, are worsening in a way 
that recalls imperial patriarchy, particularly in agrarian con-
texts, but also in new urban sites of female industrial labour 
in garment, electronics and ‘global sweatshops’.
A third generic form is ethnic inequality. Imperial ranks 
demote poor ethnic minorities to lower echelons, where 
inequality embeds itself in minority cultures. India’s Muslim 
population is becoming comparatively poorer, especially in 
the rapidly growing urbanised state of Gujarat, a showpiece 
of neo-liberal globalisation. Ethnic minority and tribal popula-
tions in poor north-eastern states and in the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts have continued to lose ground, reflecting their location 
on imperial and national peripheries.
Class inequality in the imperial ranks – a fourth generic form 
of inequality – divides people into haves and have-nots, most 
basically through the distribution of proprietary entitlements 
that translate into education, business and employment 
opportunities. In India, upward trajectories of social mobility 
into urban elite ranks typically start in rich market towns and 
in irrigated, rice-growing villages, where up-and-comers own 
property whose value has increased over time much more 
than that of dry farmland. Even today, owners of dry land are 
much less likely to benefit in situ from connections to urban 
sites of globalisation. Impoverished farmers around booming 
cities like Bangalore and Hyderabad, always on the verge of 
famine, routinely commit suicide under the humiliation of 
crushing debt. 
Landless workers, meanwhile, dominate the lowest income 
groups who have seen their real incomes decline. Deindustri-
alization and casualization of labour under free-market flex-
ible production regimes render urban and rural workers more 
vulnerable to poverty, and the UN’s ‘inequality predicament’ 
report has stressed above all the poverty effects of being cast 
into the world’s growing informal economy. Exchange entitle-
ments for poor wage workers have been further distressed by 
inflation and reduced subsidies for basic commodities. Pro-
portionate wage increases favour more educated workers in 
settings where education is unavailable.
Generic patterns of imperial inequality overlap to generate 
others. Health inequalities of many kinds arise at their inter-
sections. So does violence. A ‘Maoist rebel crescent’ of class 
war has spread across the poorest mountain regions of Nepal 
and impoverished Bihar, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh. In 
northeast India and Gujarat, minority impoverishment feeds 
political violence. Growing inequality has sparked caste vio-
lence in Tamil Nadu and religious violence in Bangladesh. 
History in the present
By exploring how the productive use of wealth inside explicit, 
changing ranks of imperial entitlement has driven economic 
growth in Asia over space and time, we can thus enrich Ankie 
Hoogvelt’s idea that world capitalism operates in networks of 
mobility. When markets operate unchecked inside such sys-
tems of entitlement, they guide new wealth up the ranks and 
thus aggravate inequality, even as they stimulate economic 
growth. 
Imperial power and authority have had a changing impact in 
each historic phase of economic development. Today, imperial 
inequality is generating neo-liberal policy regimes designed to 
‘free’ markets from political interference by people who might 
challenge imperial power. In this context, focusing national 
economic development policies primarily on growth conceals 
imperial ranks that determine actual market operations. His-
tory suggests that pro-poor policies will not be able to reduce 
inequality under neo-liberal policy regimes sufficiently to 
secure sustainable growth, poverty reduction and social jus-
tice, because markets, left to their own devices, strengthen 
imperial forms of entitlement and aggravate inequality. 
With this in mind, we can see in retrospect that British, 
French and Dutch imperialists were not the villains they often 
appear to be, because any policy maker – foreign imperialist, 
native nationalist, socialist or communist – who imagines the 
world as being a flat national plane of capitalist development, 
bereft of all vertical forms of imperial power and authority, is 
effectively encouraging the continued flow of wealth up the 
imperial ranks. Thus the inequality predicament is no impen-
etrable conundrum. Its solution requires sustained downward 
shifts in power over the production of wealth. That in turn 
demands more, and more profound, studies of imperial ter-
ritoriality in order to inform anti-imperial struggles in every 
nook and cranny of globalisation. <
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http://www.iias.nl/asia/wertheim/?q=node/5
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